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  • The age of multiple endings: when everything that stands begins to fall

    We’re living through something unprecedented: not one crisis, but the simultaneous collapse of multiple world orders.

    The post-war international architecture buckles. Economic orthodoxies disintegrate. Democratic legitimacy erodes. Shared truth fragments into competing realities. And beneath it all, AI advances towards capabilities that will fundamentally reorder what it means to work, to create, to be human.

    These aren’t separate crises – they’re symptoms of something deeper. The question isn’t whether these systems are ending, but whether we’re witnessing the end of modernity itself.

    At NEXT25 in Hamburg, this pattern of cascading endings formed the conference’s throughline. What emerged wasn’t despair but clearer sight. We inhabit what Antonio Gramsci called the interregnum – “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”

    This piece synthesises themes from the conference to map our current condition: geopolitical rupture, economic transformation, energy paradoxes, populist surges, epistemic collapse, and technological disruption. Not as isolated problems, but as interconnected transformations reshaping civilisation.

    The proper question isn’t how to end the interregnum – that presumes a resolution that may never arrive – but how to live within it, build within it, maintain possibility within it. What comes after may not be one new order, but many experiments in making permanent liminality livable.

    Read on to understand the age we’re living through – and the choices that might shape what comes next.

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    Stand at the right vantage point in late 2025, and you can watch multiple worlds ending simultaneously. Not with theatrical finality, but through the slow dissolution of systems we once took for granted. The post-war international order buckles under its own contradictions. Economic orthodoxies that governed for four decades collapse into policy chaos. Democratic institutions lose legitimacy even as elections multiply. The very notion of shared truth fragments into competing realities. And beneath it all, artificial intelligence advances toward capabilities that will fundamentally reorder what it means to work, to create, to be human.

    At NEXT25 in Hamburg, this pattern of cascading endings formed the conference’s throughline. As discussed here:

    The common thread, however, is the sense of an epochal break, a turning point in time. 1968, that iconic year, symbolised a fresh beginning, the escalation of protests against the old and demands for something new. 2025 is reminiscent of a right-wing 1968, albeit with a very different style and objectives. But it’s not conservative in any sense of the word.

    The signs have been accumulating since at least 2016. As we observe, “it’s time to face a new reality and abandon some of our favourite illusions about politics, technology, and the economy.“

    The question is no longer whether these systems are ending, but what comes after. And more unsettlingly: Are we witnessing not merely the end of particular arrangements, but the end of modernity itself?

    The geopolitical rupture

    Something shifted fundamentally when Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined BRICS in January 2024, alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran. This wasn’t diplomatic theatre. Major powers were openly constructing alternative institutional frameworks, declaring in effect that the American unipolar moment had definitively ended.

    The collapse of the liberal order

    The architecture that Francis Fukuyama prematurely called “the end of history“ is collapsing not from external shock but internal incoherence. A Chatham House analysis notes:

    The ‘liberal international order’ that has been predominant, if often controversial, since 1945 is being challenged as never before. This reflects factors both long-standing and recent: the rise of China; the frustrations and ambitions of countries – including many in the Global South – that associate the US-led liberal international order with deep hypocrisy; inequality within liberal democracies that has given rise to populism; Russian revanchism; and perhaps above all, the US’s more nationalist outlook and disruptive foreign policy since Donald Trump took office for the second time in early 2025.

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was notable as perhaps the first time that NATO and its allies failed to achieve their goals, potentially symbolising the end of the unipolar moment. This wasn’t merely a military setback. It demonstrated that Western military and economic power, however formidable, could no longer simply dictate outcomes. NEXT22 explored how the invasion marked a historical threshold – when Russia invaded Ukraine, things would never be the same again, ushering in ”the after times“ where history resumed its cyclical patterns and the taken-for-granted stability of the post-Cold War era dissolved.

    Multipolar disorder

    What emerges is not a return to familiar patterns – neither 19th-century balance of power nor Cold War bipolarity – but something unprecedented. Multiple centres of power with overlapping spheres, competing governance models, fluid alliances. The Munich Security Conference warns that increasing great-power tensions have already made it more difficult to agree on and fund peacekeeping operations, while the world is experiencing a record number of armed conflicts.

    The Global South’s assertion of agency proves particularly consequential. These countries aren’t choosing sides; they’re choosing themselves, picking and choosing alliances based on interest rather than ideology. The West’s claim to universal legitimacy – always contested, now openly dismissed – cannot survive this realignment.

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    What dies here is not American power per se, but the presumption that any single power can or should organise the world. This marks the end of modernity’s geopolitical assumptions – that Western values and institutions would eventually become universal, that history moved in a single direction. The end of modernity manifests in the multipolar disorder replacing American hegemony.

    The economic transformation

    The end of neoliberalism announces itself in concrete, measurable ways. At the end of World War II, fewer than five border walls existed globally, and even by the Cold War’s close, there were fewer than a dozen. Their sudden proliferation tells a story: the world is closing, not opening. Trade restrictions increased fivefold from 524 in 2015 to 3,000 in 2023.

    The pandemic accelerated recognition of this transformation. In January 2021, we observed: “In the aftermath of the pandemic, we should never see capitalism in the same way again.” What 2020 revealed – that markets are “social phenomena, necessarily underpinned – and underwritten – by an infrastructure provided by the collective” – had always been true, but the crisis made denial impossible.

    Since 2020, major publications from the New York Times to Foreign Policy have questioned whether neoliberalism has ended. The debate is settled – what remains is figuring out what comes next. Despite America’s growing political polarisation, Democrats and Republicans seem to agree that the globalisation of yesteryear should be put out of its misery.

    The geometry of trade

    Yet this isn’t a simple reversal. Global trade as a percentage of GDP remains roughly stable, oscillating between 55% and 60%. What’s changing is the geometry – trade becoming more regional, more explicitly political, more weaponised. Academic research shows that:

    Globalization 1.0 assumes that the United States-led neoliberal project would develop seamless connections between trading nations. I suggest that globalization 2.0 eschews the building of this modality of connection as discourses about risks shift to discourses of transnational threats.

    The policy alternatives emerging prove troubling. Industrial policy risks subsidy wars between nations desperate to dominate future industries. Economic nationalism threatens the efficiency gains of integrated supply chains. Protectionism could trigger recession just as demographic decline reduces growth potential. We face, paradoxically, both the end of artificial scarcity – housing, energy, infrastructure could all be abundant given political will – and the continuation of shortages driven by policy failure.

    The collapse of neoliberalism without a coherent successor framework suggests something deeper than mere policy transition. It points toward the end of modernity’s economic logic itself – the assumption that market mechanisms combined with state intervention could deliver perpetual growth and prosperity. The end of modernity’s economic order leaves us without roadmap or replacement.

    The energy crisis: systems under strain

    Last year’s NEXT conference examined “New Energy – Recharging our Systems” with particular focus on the rapid development and transformation of our energy needs and energy systems. The timing proved prescient. We face not merely an energy transition but an energy paradox: simultaneous crisis of supply, demand, infrastructure, and purpose.

    The immediate crisis manifests as the artificial scarcity of energy. Despite technological capacity for abundance, expensive energy contributes directly to working-class anger, driving populist movements.

    Systemic infrastructure mismatch

    But the deeper issue is systemic. The energy infrastructure built for the 20th century – centralised, fossil-fuel-based, designed for predictable demand – confronts 21st-century realities: renewable intermittency, distributed generation, electrification of everything, and AI’s voracious energy appetite. The International Energy Agency projects that global electricity demand from data centres will more than double to around 945 terawatt-hours by 2030, slightly more than Japan’s entire electricity consumption today. We’re building an AI economy on an energy system designed for an industrial one.

    Understanding this requires systems thinking. As we’ve long argued, we live in a world of complex, interdependent systems, and any thinking that fails to include that runs the risk of summoning the law of unintended consequences. Energy systems don’t exist in isolation – they intersect with political systems, economic systems, infrastructure systems, all interconnected in ways that make simple solutions impossible.

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    The geopolitical dimension compounds the technical challenge. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine didn’t just cause an energy shock – it revealed the strategic vulnerability of energy dependence. As Jessica Berlin warned at NEXT22, the invasion marked a moment requiring us to rethink how we live to minimise the crisis.

    Europe’s rushed pivot away from Russian gas exposed infrastructure deficits, regulatory bottlenecks, and the fragility of energy systems lacking adequate storage capacity and alternative supply routes. The result: inflation fueling political instability, which, in turn, undermines the political consensus needed for the energy transition.

    From scarcity to abundance

    In times of dissonance and endless disruption, we badly need new energy to recharge our systems.

    This was NEXT24’s opening statement. But “new energy” means more than renewable sources. It means reimagining the entire energy paradigm – from centralised to distributed, from extraction to circulation, from scarcity logic to abundance logic. The technology exists. Solar and wind are now the cheapest forms of electricity in most markets. Battery storage costs have plummeted.

    NEXT25 explored how electric vehicles are becoming “batteries on wheels” – active participants in the energy system through vehicle-to-grid technology, turning cars into distributed storage assets that can help balance supply and demand. The barrier is political: regulatory inertia, incumbent resistance, and the same bureaucratic dysfunction strangling housing and infrastructure development.

    The energy question thus crystallises the broader crisis: we possess technical solutions to material problems but lack political capacity to implement them. This gap – between what’s technically possible and what’s politically achievable – defines the end of modernity in its most tangible form. The modern project promised that reason and organisation could overcome material constraints.

    When we can no longer translate knowledge into action, modernity’s core promise fails. This energy paradox exemplifies the end of modernity in concrete terms: we possess solutions but cannot implement them. Until we close this gap, energy remains a driver of instability rather than a foundation of prosperity.

    The populist surge

    In 2024, voters worldwide expressed dissatisfaction through the ballot box, with a median of 64% of adults across 34 countries saying their national economy was in bad shape. The incumbent bloodbath that followed wasn’t random. It reflected structural dissatisfaction with political classes across ideological lines.

    The far-right gained ground across Europe and beyond. In Austria, the FPÖ emerged as the leading party in 2024 elections with 28.9% of the vote; in Italy, the Fratelli d’Italia coalition came to power with 25.99% in 2022. These weren’t protest votes. They represented genuine political realignments, often with right-wing parties increasing their vote share in successive elections.

    The roots of discontent

    Pew Research documents this shift:

    Frustrations with the political class have created opportunities for right-wing populists and other challengers to traditional parties and the political status quo. Several elections this year [2024] in Europe highlighted this trend: Right-wing populist parties, many of which campaigned on sharply anti-immigration platforms, gained ground in this year’s European parliamentary elections.

    The causes remain contested: economic dislocation versus cultural backlash, globalisation versus immigration, inequality versus identity. But a UN report links the global rise of right-wing populism directly to the decline in social protections. More specifically, researchers identify housing market stress as a key driver:

    “It is the radical right – and not the mainstream left – that attracts voters who face increasing economic risks in the housing market.”

    This reveals something important: the welfare state’s crisis isn’t just fiscal or ideological. It’s functional. When basic needs like housing become speculative assets, when infrastructure crumbles, when energy becomes unaffordable, politics radicalises. The right-wing populists aren’t manufacturing grievances; they’re exploiting real failures of governance.

    Yet their proposed solutions often worsen underlying problems. Immigration restrictions don’t build houses. Nationalism doesn’t repair infrastructure. Distrust of institutions doesn’t improve state capacity. We face a perverse cycle: governance failure drives populism, which further degrades governance capacity, which drives more populism.

    This dynamic reveals the end of modernity’s political settlement – the social contract between citizens and states that promised security, prosperity, and progress in exchange for democratic participation and social cohesion has broken down without a viable alternative emerging.

    The epistemic crisis

    Perhaps the most destabilising ending is epistemic. We’ve moved beyond post-truth to something stranger: the multiplication of truth-regimes, each with its own apparatuses of validation, its own authorities, its own standards of evidence.

    Michel Foucault described how every society has a “regime of truth” – the rules for distinguishing true from false, the institutions that produce and validate truth, the political economy governing its circulation. According to Foucault:

    In societies like ours the ‘political economy’ of truth is characterised by five historically important traits: ‘truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to a constant economic and political incitation; it is the object, under diverse forms, of an immense diffusion and consumption; it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses; lastly, it is the stake of a whole political debate and social confrontation.

    The internet didn’t destroy this regime so much as pluralise it. As we observed in 2019 about Parallelwelten (parallel worlds), truth has lost its singularity in favour of a multitude of parallel worlds, each maintaining its own truths. Multiple regimes now compete, each fighting for supremacy with all available means – discursive, economic, political, cultural.

    We’ve explored since at least 2019 how Big Tech platforms create the rules others must follow, with little democratic oversight – the digital sphere increasingly defines, controls and governs the analogue world without real democratic checks and balances. What matters increasingly isn’t whether something is true or false, but whether it serves one’s group, advances one’s cause, fits one’s worldview.

    The Jankowicz case

    The case of Nina Jankowicz illustrates the dynamic. In 2022, she was appointed to lead the Disinformation Governance Board within the Department of Homeland Security. As she recalled:

    Within hours of the board’s public launch, partisan media, influencers, and members of Congress were calling it a “Ministry of Truth” and claiming that I would be censoring Americans’ speech. They did this entirely without evidence; as demonstrated by the board’s founding documents and my five-hour sworn deposition before the House Judiciary Committee in 2023, the board had nothing to do with censorship. Its mission was to protect civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and the First Amendment.

    Our take:

    The Ministry of Truth is, of course, a fictional department in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, whose mission is to rewrite history. The board that was attacked in this way was dissolved shortly thereafter. Disinformation had won the battle; truth had lost.

    When everything can be called fake news, nothing can be. Experts dismissed as elites lose their authority entirely. Partisan media breeds universal mistrust. This isn’t Orwellian manipulation of truth; it’s something more corrosive – the exhaustion of truth as a political category.

    The consequences cascade. Without shared epistemic foundations, democratic deliberation becomes impossible. Conspiracy theories proliferate in the absence of trusted arbiters. Common facts vanish, and society fragments into incompatible realities.

    This may be the most fundamental ending of all – not of truth itself, but of the social mechanisms by which we once agreed on what counted as true. The end of modernity might ultimately be defined not by technological change or economic transformation, but by the collapse of shared reality itself.

    The technological transformation

    David Mattin’s NEXT25 keynote posed the question directly: What’s left for humans when AI can do most of our work? The question isn’t hypothetical. AI performance shows the scariest exponential curve happening right now, though it’s still slow enough that we don’t feel it day to day – a boiling frog situation, with AGI no longer sci-fi but possibly close to reality.

    David explained:

    We are shifting out of one economic system, one civilisational system, to another. We are amid a convergence of new technologies, that are all coming together to push us out of our current systems into something profoundly new.

    The timing proves consequential. In advanced economies, the human population is about to peak and fall into steep decline just as AI and humanoid robots come online – as Kevin Kelly wrote in “The Handoff to Bots”, we’re about to hand over the reins of our civilisations to the robots we’ve built.

    When AI handles knowledge work, corporate structures might hollow out, replaced by independent operators working with AI tools. We might see AI-to-AI transactions in virtual economies, heading toward what Mattin calls a social and economic singularity – AI replacing human economic inputs, transforming scarcity into abundance. As he notes:

    Our role in the economy was to change scarcity into abundance. We turned that into the purpose, the meaning of us. Religion faded away, and we turned our jobs into our meaning. When machines can do that, what is our meaning then?

    This anxiety pervades contemporary discourse about AI, manifesting as either utopian fantasies or apocalyptic fears. This represents the end of modernity as we’ve understood it – work-based identity giving way to an undefined future, the substitution of economic purpose for religious purpose now collapsing under automation’s advance.

    What humans will matter for

    Yet Mattin offered a different frame: humans will matter for precisely what machines cannot replicate – a theme we’ve addressed since at least 2018. As he put it:

    You are a human being. A machine can never be a human being. If we accept that, we’ll stop being confused about some of the things we’re deeply confused about right now. Our apex need is to be seen by another human being, to share experience and communication. Everything you deliver of value into the economy will come from the part of you that can stand in front of another human and share what it means to be human.

    The thing that will become scarce is understanding other humans’ feelings. Caring, counselling, genuine creativity – not AI-generated content, but outputs emerging from human-AI collaboration that transcend what either could achieve alone. This suggests that the end of work as we’ve known it could enable a beginning – not of leisure, but of different forms of labour centred on meaning-making, connection, care.

    Whether this happens depends on political choices about how abundance gets distributed, whether humans are valued beyond their economic productivity, whether we can look up from screens and actually see each other. David concluded:

    We need to come together as a collective to establish rules and norms for technology, ensuring it remains under control and benefits us. We need to share the abundance the machines create, rather than it falling into fewer hands. And we have to decide that humans matter.

    Modernity’s end?

    Which returns us to the fundamental question: Are these discrete endings of particular systems, or something more profound – the end of modernity itself? We’ve been investigating this question since 2018 (or possibly earlier), examining whether we live in postmodernity, liquid modernity, or what David Mattin termed “augmented modernity”.

    Foreign Policy observes:

    The details varied from country to country and across different political and social milieus, but in the modern era, there was a fundamental story, a ‘grand narrative,’ in the words of philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, that seemed plausible to most people in the Western political mainstream. It was a story about increasing prosperity linked to economic growth, about technological and scientific progress, about the universality of human rights and the indispensable advantages of a specific liberal-democratic model of society. This narrative of development — world history as a bildungsroman— no longer comforts us as it once did.

    The collapse of temporal certainty

    Economic growth proves ecologically catastrophic. Scientific progress generates technological unemployment and existential risk. Universal values fragment into competing particularisms. Liberal democracy loses appeal even in liberal democracies. The global financial crisis undermined trust in financial institutions. The Covid pandemic collapsed confidence in scientific expertise and traditional media.

    Whether we call this postmodernity or late modernity matters less than recognising the condition: multiple visions now compete with no single model commanding hegemonic legitimacy. Chinese state capitalism, Islamic political theology, Silicon Valley techno-libertarianism, European social democracy – each offers partial answers without universal persuasiveness.

    The modern assumption that one civilisational form would eventually prevail has died. At NEXT22, David Mattin argued that “modernity is done” – that the new tension is between those who think we can transcend human nature and those who think society will collapse.

    Modernity’s temporal foundation

    Perhaps modernity’s core feature was a particular relationship to time – progress as master narrative, history as development, change as improvement. The Industrial Revolution installed clock-time as the dominant temporal regime: linear, measurable, synchronised across distances. Time was structured around work and productivity, with the factory whistle and the train timetable organising collective life around the mechanical rhythms of industrial capitalism.

    What ends is not change itself but the presumption that change represents progress, that time moves forward toward improvement. We now live in what sociologist Manuel Castells calls ”timeless time” – where global communication networks compress time to the point where it almost disappears, where everything happens simultaneously in a perpetual present that erodes both past and future. The linearity of industrial time collapses into what François Hartog describes as “presentism” – the tyranny of the moment, the treadmill of an infinite now.

    We’re left with transformation without telos, constant disruption without clear direction, the exhausting work of adaptation without the faith that we’re adapting toward something better. When time loses its narrative structure, when the sequence of past-present-future dissolves into simultaneity, modernity’s temporal foundation crumbles.

    Antonio Gramsci wrote that ”the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” We inhabit such an interregnum, stuck between a post-war order that no longer functions and successor systems not yet formed.

    This might actually be what postmodernity means – not a new epoch succeeding modernity, but the condition of existing after the modern certainties have dissolved, before new certainties (if such are possible) crystallise. The interregnum extends indefinitely. The morbid symptoms become permanent features. We learn to navigate turbulence without expecting it to resolve into stability.

    Navigating the interregnum

    The proper question isn’t how to end the interregnum – that presumes a resolution that may never arrive – but how to live within it, build within it, maintain possibility within it. The end of modernity means learning to navigate ceaseless change without the compass of progress, to construct without knowing the final form.

    David Mattin explored at NEXT22 how we face system shifts – true disruption – in which the systems around and within our businesses change rapidly and unpredictably. These are systemic changes: the new reality of work, supply chains and the return of scarcity, the shift to digital infrastructure, crises of truth and trust, and the new need for care. Understanding these interconnected transformations requires embracing systems thinking rather than seeking simple solutions to complex problems.

    The crisis of institutions

    The mistrust of institutions has real foundations. States have failed to deliver basic functions: housing, infrastructure, security. Expert classes have presided over disasters while insulating themselves from consequences. Democratic institutions have proven vulnerable to oligarchic capture. As we observe:

    The mistrust of the deep state has a true core, even if the term itself has been discredited as a right-wing battle cry. Ironically, however, it is now the digital oligopolies that want to seize power and replace liberal democracy with an authoritarian technocracy.

    Yet the alternative – Silicon Valley oligarchs replacing democratic institutions with technocratic authoritarianism – proves worse. We’ve been documenting since 2017 how Big Tech companies have streamed innovation into their own control rather than genuinely facilitating the lives we want to live.

    By January 2025, the process culminated in what can only be described as Big Tech taking control of politics itself – a tech oligarchy with unprecedented concentration of economic, political, technological, and media power. Faith in technology substituting for faith in democratic process leads to intensified oligarchy, not liberation. Technology requires intelligent frameworks to flourish as force for good rather than domination.

    Yet as Indy Johar states, the deeper challenge is recognising that “we are living through the exhaustion of democracy as we have known it”. Our institutions, designed for the 19th century, have become “architectures of lag: structurally incapable of reasoning, deciding, or acting at the temporal velocity and systemic interdependence of the 21st”. The task isn’t preserving these forms but refounding democracy as “an evolving architecture for perceiving, deciding, and acting together within complexity”.

    Escaping false binaries

    Building these new democratic architectures and intelligent technology frameworks requires moving beyond old dichotomies. What might this involve? States defending freedom and security through the rule of law and regulations that prevent monopoly. Welfare systems covering existential risks without creating dependency. Infrastructure investment combining public direction with private execution. Democratic institutions redesigned for complexity rather than simplicity, resilience rather than optimisation.

    This requires escaping what Andreas Reckwitz identified as liberalism’s crisis:

    The welfare state that emerged in response to the social question created a culture of dependency, while neoliberal market radicalism (in response to excessive state regulation) increased social inequality and weakened the public infrastructure. This is the Gordian knot of illusion and confusion that we have to cut.

    Neither pure state nor pure market offers solutions. We need to cut this Gordian knot, but we can’t cut it cleanly — we must untangle it thread by thread, experimentally, locally, provisionally. Indy Johar argues that this requires “the courage to admit that democracy, in its current form, is broken” – not to abandon it, but to reforge it as “a living capability of society” rather than a static system preserved through nostalgia.

    The work ahead isn’t systematic transformation according to blueprint. It’s more modest and more difficult: maintaining possibility within chaos, building alternatives within the shell of failing systems, preserving what deserves preservation while allowing necessary endings to occur.

    What comes after

    The endings we face are irreversible. The post-war liberal international order won’t be restored. Neoliberal globalisation won’t return. Expert authority won’t regain automatic deference. AI won’t stop advancing. Energy systems won’t revert to 20th-century models. These aren’t problems to solve but realities to navigate.

    We’ve been articulating this truth since the pandemic years. In October 2021, we observed: “It seems unlikely we’ll ‘snap back’ to our pre-pandemic lives.” By early 2022, this had hardened into certainty: “Forcing a return to the old normal is not a viable adaptation to the new pressures” facing society. The lesson of 2020 was stark: “You can’t assume that things will always continue much as before.”

    New patterns emerging

    Yet endings contain beginnings. What’s ending might be illusions that needed to end – the illusion of permanent American hegemony, of endless growth without ecological cost, of technological progress as salvation, of expertise without accountability, of democracy on autopilot, of cheap energy without consequence.

    Even within the interregnum, new patterns of meaning-making emerge. Alex Danco argues that “Prediction” is succeeding postmodernism as a cultural movement – not forecasting the future but participating in shaping it through timing, information contribution, and being “predictive of the game, rather than predicted by the game”.

    Where postmodernism offered personalised consumption wrapped in unthreatening simulacra, the prediction aesthetic embraces friction and timing as meaning itself. Where modernity promised progress and postmodernity offered innovation (with your capital at risk…), prediction reframes purpose around contributing information to create order in the universe.

    This manifests everywhere: the explosion of prediction markets and speculation; the shift from “innovation” to “adoption” as the governing metaphor; the recognition that when you engage matters as much as how; the understanding that contributing information that AI doesn’t yet know becomes a form of value creation. Whether this represents genuine cultural transformation or merely late capitalism’s most sophisticated form remains contested. But it suggests that even permanent liminality generates new modes of participation and meaning.

    Toward humbler futures

    What might come after could be humbler and more sustainable: multipolar governance accepting that no single civilisation will dominate; economic systems valuing resilience over pure efficiency; technological development directed toward human flourishing rather than displacement; democratic experimentation with new forms beyond exhausted institutions; energy systems designed for distributed abundance rather than centralised control; epistemic pluralism without epistemic chaos. And perhaps, as Danco suggests, new forms of purpose emerging from our ability to contribute information and participate in collective sense-making, even as AI handles much of material production.

    This requires choices:

    • about how AI-generated abundance gets distributed;

    • whether we establish rules and norms for technology before it establishes rules and norms for us;

    • whether we decide humans matter beyond economic productivity;

    • whether we can share experience and communicate across the fragments into which society has shattered;

    • whether we can build energy systems adequate to the challenges ahead.

    The age of multiple endings is also, potentially, the age of multiple beginnings. Not one grand narrative replacing another, but many experiments, many attempts to build livable futures within the ruins of failed systems. Whether these coalesce into new cultural movements like Danco’s “Prediction”, or remain fragmented adaptations, or prove merely the final forms of dying systems rendered perfect at their moment of obsolescence – this remains uncertain.

    Choices ahead

    The task isn’t to restore what was – that path is closed – but to discover what might be possible after the illusions end, after the certainties dissolve, in an interregnum that may prove permanent.

    We stand at a threshold. The old forms are dying. What is new cannot yet be born. Morbid symptoms multiply. This is where we are, and perhaps where we’ll remain – permanently liminal, constantly adapting, forever between orders. The question is whether we can make such a condition livable, even generative, or whether the permanent crisis proves ultimately unsustainable.

    That remains to be seen. The experiment is underway. We are the experiment.

    More about NEXT25

    First published at nextconf.eu. Picture by geralt / Pixabay

  • How the Big Tech oligarchy came to power

    Donald Trump is back, and so am I. It’s a remarkable comeback, but it also marks the rise of the Big Tech tycoons. Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, Sundar Pichai, Elon Musk, Tim Cook and TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew attended Trump’s second inauguration this week, and not by chance.

    It’s the culmination of a process that’s been decades in the making, and something we’ve been warned about many times. Is it safe to say that Trump’s successor will be a president by the grace of Big Tech?

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    As the dead come to call
    And the darkness descends
    At the end of it all’s
    Where the party begins

    Yes, it’s awful to gloat
    Even so, we just hope that you know
    We told you so
    We told you so

    The Stupendium & Dan Bull, We Told You So

    We’re witnessing a change of power. The Big Tech oligarchy is finally taking over. Democracy will look different after the fact.

    But the process that culminated in the Trump-Musk bromance didn’t happen overnight. The generous regulation of the early web paved the way for the meteoric rise of Big Tech to the top of the world economy. Over three decades, they became the biggest empires in the history of humankind.

    In hindsight, 2016 turns out to have been a pivotal year. In June, the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU. And in November, Donald Trump won, as we now know, his first term as president of the United States. Both votes were probably tipped by the use of what we still call social media, heavily influenced by bots and foreign – i.e. Russian – agencies. Disinformation became a thing.

    Social media is mainstream media

    Not that there hadn’t been disinformation and propaganda before. But after World War II and the devastating experience of totalitarian propaganda, Germany and many Western countries had at least set up a decent framework for media regulation to keep disinformation and media tycoons at bay, while limiting governmental influence on the media sphere. All of this still exists today, but it’s almost irrelevant in the new era:

    Social media is mainstream media now. It’s where the majority of the world gets its news. Though who even cares about news? It’s where the world gets its memes and jokes and consumes its endlessly mutating trends. Forget “internet culture”. The internet is culture. And this is where this election was fought and won … long before a single person cast a ballot.

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    Soon after the 2016 US election, it became clear that social media had departed from its social roots. It had slowly turned into another branch of professional, commercial media, governed by algorithms under the sole control of the tech platform owner oligarchy. The platforms, while still claiming immunity for the third-party content generated by its users, had taken over control. Regulators enforced moderation, and algorithms took care of the rest. In 2017, we wrote:

    Twitter, like the internet, does not in itself lead to freedom of thought and expression. While it can empower users to raise their voices, it can also amplify the voices of those who already own a huge mindshare. Donald Trump has proven that Twitter can be highly effective in addressing vast crowds of followers, bypassing traditional media. The same applies to other platforms like Facebook. While the digital field is indeed different, it is not completely dissimilar from the incumbent media sphere. The attention economy works in favour of those who understand how to capture the most attention.

    Early warnings

    The clever use of algorithms had turned social media into drugs, addicting users. Those were the years when we learned about ludic loops. Not that there weren’t some early warnings. Jonathan Franzen, for example, wrote the following in a piece for The Atlantic (2013):

    In the mid-’90s, when I started to feel worried about what was happening to literature with the introduction of the third screen, and with the increasingly materialistic view of human nature that psychopharmacology was producing, I was looking for some way to describe how technology and consumerism feed on each other and take over our lives. How seductive and invasive but also unsatisfying they are. How we go back to them more and more, because they’re unsatisfying, and become ever more dependent on them. The groupthink of the Internet and the constant electronic stimulation of the devices start to erode the very notion of an individual who is capable of, say, producing a novel. The phrase I reached for to describe all this was “an infernal machine.” Something definitionally consumerist, something totalitarian in its exclusion of other ways of being, something that appears in the world and manufactures our desires through its own developmental logic, something that does damage but just seems to keep perpetuating itself.

    Quoting Franzen, this was our take in 2018:

    In short, technology married consumerism and transformed itself into an infernal machine. This techno-consumerism now eats up our lives. We live in a world where technology is worshipped as a solution to each and every problem. Silicon Valley has already started to institutionalise its religious beliefs. For lack of a better term, Swiss entrepreneur Wolfram Klingler calls this newfangled religion Digitalism. Author and academic John Naughton speaks of the Church of Tech(nopoly).

    At that time, around the middle of Trump’s first term in office, tech looked like a hot mess that needed to be fixed more and more urgently. It was the time when the call for regulation grew louder, when the EU upped its game in the fight against the growing dominance of the tech oligopoly, and GDPR came into force. The Californian Ideology on which Big Tech is based began to reveal its flipside:

    The libertarian ideology of Silicon Valley has a dark, authoritarian side. It can perhaps be described as a new high modernism without strong state authority, while retaining the unfaltering confidence in science and technology as a means to reorder the social and natural world.

    An epic battle

    A pattern had emerged: weakening the democratic state and its authority while shifting power to the tech oligarchy. Fixing this would require taking responsibility for our society and the greater good, not surrendering to the supposedly superior forces of technology, which increasingly defined, controlled and governed the world:

    Tech companies take human experience and turn it into a raw material that can be bought and sold. In her book on Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff describes how companies like Google and Facebook, by reengineering the economy and society to their own benefit, are perverting capitalism in a way that undermines personal freedom and corrodes democracy.

    They’ve effectively closed the loop of behaviour control. Our human behaviour is turned into data, which is processed into information and then manipulated and fed back into our information diet to control our behaviour.

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    An epic battle between authoritarianism and democracy began to loom on the horizon, with tech going over to the dark side. Half a decade ago, in 2019, the stakes were already high:

    We can read the ongoing political struggles, be it in the US, the UK or elsewhere, as a fight about these four pillars of Western liberal societies: a fight for power, freedom, democracy, and justice. Tech plays an important rule in that fight, since software engineers are hardcoding the rules others must follow.

    Politics and democracy were under pressure, but we still expected this would lead to regulation:

    Tech has become a threat to democracy. To the extent it undermines our democratic institutions, it needs to be and will be regulated. The biggest empires in history – Google and Facebook – are clashing with nation states and multinational institutions.

    In 2019, this meant, and perhaps still means, that the battle would shape up as a fight to democratise tech:

    The digital is political. This is probably anathema to the diehard digerati. They don’t want to acknowledge that the digital sphere increasingly defines, controls and governs the analogue world. But there is no real democracy in the digital sphere. Big Tech creates the rules others have to follow, with little or no democratic checks and balances.

    But instead, the oligopoly continued to gain power and influence. And vice versa, technology didn’t help democracy either:

    So far, technology spectacularly failed to create the electronic direct democracy promised by the Californian Ideology. Increasingly, it looks as if we’re about to fall back to authoritarian dictatorship as governance model. Trump and Zuckerberg are closer to each other than they appear.

    Back then, it was evident that nothing less than a real digital revolution would be necessary, with the key issue being the ownership right of personal data. More than five years later, not much has changed. Did we let our last chance to avoid digital dystopia slip? Again, from 2019:

    Modern, liberal politics is in an existential threat for its very existence. Besieged on two fronts — the authoritarian regimes happen to sow chaos, and the digital companies willing to acquire power without responsibility — it must act now, or risk passing into history, as we descend into a digital dystopia, wearing a disguise of democracy.

    We had a pretty clear picture of the situation. Little did we know what would happen next. The 2020 pandemic was a huge boost for digital disruption and a stress test for democracy. The same year, Trump lost the election, and US democracy survived his first term, despite the storming of the Capitol in early 2021. In the early days of the Biden presidency, it felt as if US authoritarianism had taken a nap.

    Our new era

    That year, we learned that our crises are interconnected. Again, we heard calls to regulate Big Tech before it’s too late. The aftermath of the pandemic turned out to be the prelude to our new era of polycrisis and permacrisis that began roughly with Putin’s escalation of the war in Ukraine.

    In October 2022, Elon Musk took control of Twitter.

    Back in 2013, another tech tycoon had bought the Washington Post: Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon. And in 2018, Marc Benioff had acquired Time magazine. While intentions may have differed, the result is the same: the tech oligarchy takes control of media companies. With Twitter, now X, Elon Musk owned the tool to tip the 2024 US election. And that’s what he did.

    At the onset of 2024, the outlook for democracy was bleak. In June, we once again called for Big Tech regulation:

    And then, there are the big digital platforms which must address the spread of misinformation, propaganda, and hatred. This is long overdue. Russian propaganda is spreading freely through the so-called social media. TikTok, a Chinese company, massively influences voters, especially the young. Elon Musk has turned Twitter into a hatred-driven outlet called X.

    This space needs a change in the regulatory framework.

    The rest is history. The battle was lost before it even took place. Big Tech now owns US politics. It’s not that the tech oligarchy is a monolith; quite the contrary. Elon Musk may play an important role in the upcoming administration, but he is one tech oligarch among others. The tech oligarchy as a whole is now in power, with a strong tendency towards autocracy, and democracy is at its mercy.

    We used to be optimistic about the survival of democracy. Here’s a quote from 2018:

    Western democracies are inclined to be quite robust. Take the US as an example. Since 1776, the US democracy has survived a civil war, two world wars, several other wars, and four sitting presidents who have been assassinated while in office.

    Chances are that the US democracy will also survive Facebook and Trump.

    At the beginning of 2025, this remains to be seen.

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    More about democracy and Big Tech

    First published at nextconf.eu. Image by Dhaval Parmar (Unsplash)

  • Herding sheep in a hybrid world

    In early 2020, we have left our old world behind us. We are now in a different world. It’s hard to grasp the breadth and depth of this change. Of course, we’ll see countless battles trying to return to the time before Covid.

    But is there a way back in time? I doubt it.

    When a herd of sheep moves from one pasture to the next, there is a particular moment while it stops in front of a gate. Eventually, when the gate is opened, the herd rushes through. Watch this video to get a glimpse of what this movement looks like. And then think about what the pandemic did to the digitisation and virtualisation of our lives. Suddenly, we find ourselves in a hybrid world.

    In many ways, we ran into closed gates when Covid-19 hit in early 2020. But then, the floodgates to the digital world were wide open, and we raced through, whether we really wanted to or not. In many parts of our lives, defaults had swiftly switched from physical to virtual: work came away from the office to become predominantly remote, shopping moved from the city centre or the shopping mall to e-commerce, physical meetings became Zoom calls, entertainment focused on the living room.

    More than a year after the gates closed for the first time, the herd is still in turmoil, exploring the new pasture. Shepherds are trying to exercise leadership. In times like ours, this precious craft is in high demand. These are times for leadership, not management. People are on the move, behaviours change and shift. We need someone who helps to find the way when we are in uncharted territories.

    Interconnected shifts

    The change we are seeing at the moment is a massive change of value and values. And both shifts are interconnected. Values like sustainability in particular and the question of purpose in general gained importance. Value creation moved to the digital sphere and the user interface. These trends have been underway for at least two decades, but it has now become impossible to ignore them. They have moved through the gate, if we stick with our metaphor.

    Likewise, the future of work or new work, as some people like to call it, had been discussed for years. Now, it’s high on the agenda, and the future of the office is only half of the equation. Everyone is talking about hybrid work models, but nobody knows what this really means. What is a hybrid company? We need to figure it out. Again, these are questions of leadership. Work and companies are, to a certain degree, digitised and virtualised.

    We work in the cloud, and companies operate in the cloud. Value creation has moved to the digital sphere. Of course, we still need factories and other physical premises of work, but even there, value creation shifts to the software. It’s not unlikely, though, that personal human care, or proximity services, may gain more value just because they are hard to digitise.

    The new urban experience

    The same might even be true for cities. The digital revolution and now the pandemic have eaten into two basic functions of urban agglomerations: work and commerce. Living in the city has been a problem for years, with skyrocketing rents and ever-longer commutes. The separation of work and living had reached the breaking point already before the pandemic hit:

    “The growing energy consumption of traffic and the imminent collapse of the infrastructure make the situation untenable. In metropolitan areas like Munich, Frankfurt or Hamburg, more than one in three employees lives outside the city.

    Meanwhile, both the factory and the office become more and more automated and virtualised. For average workers, it makes ever less sense to commute over longer distances to an office where they just use the very same tools they have at home. Hence the trend towards work from home.”

    But the value of cities is still in the proximity, the density of people, ideas, experiences in a confined space. We are in the midst of a great restructuring. The current imbalance of housing and office space in urban areas – not enough living space to accommodate all these employees – forced people into long commutes. Their urban experience was cut in half: working in the city, living in the suburbs or the countryside. This is going to change, but in many different ways. There is no single, uniform model.

    A world of hybrid cities?

    However, even the top rent for living space in Munich, Germany’s most expensive city, at €18.4 per square metre, is significantly lower than the top rent for office space, at €45 per square metre, in Frankfurt (in Munich, it’s at €40). Not to mention the top rent for retail properties which is at €360 per square metre in Munich. Given these numbers, it won’t be easy to convert retail or office space into living space.

    Hence, structural changes in the real estate sector will take some time. Rents need to decline first before significant restructuring can occur. Real estate itself won’t move to the cloud, that’s for sure, but what about cities? Will cities become virtualised? To a degree, they already are. When work and commerce migrate to the cloud, when entertainment is virtualised as well, the city as a physical spot needs to be redefined – probably along the lines of the superior experience.

    These, again, are questions of leadership. Where will the flock move to? Probably to where the grass is greenest:

    “People will always flock to regions, industries and professions where value creation is higher than elsewhere. These days it is the digital sphere where that is the case.”

    The new normal

    Our world is now inherently a physical/digital hybrid. This is the new normal. But the digital part is taking the lead. That means our world is now programmable like never before. This opens up new degrees of freedom, but it also comes with new caveats:

    “As human beings, we’ve new and powerful means to strive towards fulfilling our values. But these same means can also turn against us and our values, simply for the sake of capturing economic and business value.”

    It’s the dialectic of light and darkness that is at work here in our post-Covid, hybrid world. But:

    “What we really need is a new Renaissance: a break from the past, a new (digital) humanism, a cultural movement that takes the best from the past and translates it into our day and age. Or even better: into the next age. Whatever that will be.”

    Maybe we can call it the hybrid age.


    First published at nextconf.eu. Photo by Nareeta Martin on Unsplash